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Abstract
Recent research makes increasing use of eye-tracking methodologies to generate and test
process models. Overall, such research suggests that attention, generally indexed by fixations
(gaze duration), plays a critical role in the construction of preference, although the methods
employed to support this supposition differ substantially. In two studies we empirically test
prototypical versions of prominent processing assumptions against one another and several
base models. We find that general evidence accumulation processes provide a good fit to the
data. An accumulation process that assumes leakage and temporal variability in evidence
weighting (i.e. a primacy effect) fits the aggregate data, both in terms of choices and decision
times, and does so across varying types of choices (e.g., charitable giving and hedonic
consumption) and numbers of options well. However, when comparing models on the level of
the individual, for a majority of participants simpler models capture choice data better. The
theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: eye-tracking, attention, drift-diffusion models, evidence accumulation, choice.
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Finding the right fit: A comparison of process assumptions underlying popular drift-diffusion
models
Classic economic theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) posits that preferences
are stable and consistent, however a growing body of work indicates that preferences are
instead dynamic, possibly being constructed in the moment (Slovic, 1995). One class of
process models known as drift-diffusion models (DDMs) have shown great promise in their
ability to predict choices of consumer products (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich
& Rangel, 2010), risky prospects (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), as well as experts sport
decisions (Raab & Johnson, 2007). The basic assumption underlying all DDMs is that
preferences are constructed through a dynamic information acquisition process. Specifically,
individuals’ preferences are formed by sampling from available options until the evidence generally defined as an options’ value - supporting one option is strong enough to induce a
judgment.
While all DDMs share this foundation, the models themselves vary substantially in
their complexity and formulation, as do the data processing techniques (e.g., how fixations are
identified) employed to construct and test them. This individualistic approach to process
modeling presents a direct problem for the advancement of cognitive theory as the ability to
implement differing models across studies, while directly testing the efficacy of their
processing assumptions against one another, becomes an arduous task. In the current paper we
extract the core processing assumptions of such models in order to compare them in terms of
their ability to predict decisions and decision (reaction) times (Krajbich et al., 2011; Luce,
1986; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).
The Contenders
Baseline Models
Before one can argue that attentional allocation (operationalized as fixation durations
in the current studies) is crucial to predictions of choice it must be shown that directed
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attention is solely, or in combination with subjective ratings of value, a better predictor than
simple utility maximization models. In order to test if this is the case we generate and
compare three baseline models.
The first (Basev), is a simple utility maximization model predicting that option i will
be chosen if its value (Vi) is higher than all other options’ values, where Vi is determined
solely by an individuals’ subjective valuation of that option (si):
For all options i:

Vi = si

Equation 1

The second base model (Basea), is a simple DDM that predicts that the option i which
receives the most attention (i.e., is fixated on for the longest period of time) will be selected.
Thus, the value (Vi) for an option is equal to the sum of the gaze durations (e) of all fixations
(f) to this option. We define e to be measured in seconds here and in the following1:
For all options i:

𝑓
𝑉𝑖 = ∑𝑗=1 𝑒𝑗

Equation 2

The final baseline model we consider is a Standard Accumulator Model (SAM) which
predicts that an options’ subjective-value (si) is multiplied by the sum of its gaze durations (e)
across all fixations (f) and the option i with the highest resulting value (V) is selected:
For all options i:

𝑓

𝑉𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 ∑𝑗=1 𝑒𝑗

Equation 3

Primacy-Recency Models
The first type of process model we explore is the primacy-recency variant (Glöckner et
al., 2012; Raab & Johnson, 2007). Models of this type suggest that incoming evidence is
weighted more (recency) or less (primacy) than previously accumulated evidence. The
underlying theoretical basis for models of this type stems from memory research, which
consistently reveals robust serial position effects in memory recall (for review see, Laming,
2010). For example, items encountered earlier and later in a list of to be remembered items
are recalled more frequently than items presented in the middle of the list (Murdock, 1962).

1

Different scalings had no effect.
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Thus, for this DDM variant, greater weighting for already accumulated information reflects
the fact that there is an increased likelihood for earlier encountered information to be
remembered, while greater weighting for incoming information would reflect the fact that
recently encountered information is more easily recalled.
For our purposes we generate our Primacy/Recency Model (PRM) for the value of an
object as a weighted sum of the previous value and the current value using one free weighting
parameter δ as follows:
If fixation to object i:

Vi(j) = δVi(j-1) + si*ej

For all unattended objects k≠i:

Vk(j) = Vk(j-1)

Equation 4a
Equation 4b

The value (Vi) for an option i starts with a value of zero prior to the first fixation (Vi(0)
= 0). The Vi at each subsequent fixation j is calculated by the subjective-value (si) of the
fixated option multiplied by the gaze-duration in seconds (e) at fixation j to option i, and the
previous Vi multiplied by δ, which can take any value from 0 to 10 and indicates a primacy or
recency effect. Specifically, if δ is found to be smaller than one, recency is indicated while if
δ is larger than one primacy is indicated. For options that are not the focus of attention, Vi
remains unchanged (Equation 4b). Importantly, the PRM equates to the SAM if δ is set equal
to one and equates to the Basea if all si had the same value.
Leaky Accumulator Models
Another popular DDM process is the leaky accumulator, which posits that
accumulated evidence about a given option diminishes over time (Usher & McClelland, 2001,
2004). The leaky accumulator variants are also formulated on theories related to memory
processes, in particular the activation and inhibition of neural networks tasked with processing
and storing information (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). In the current context this implies
that when information supportive of an option is being accumulated (is the focus of gaze),
retained information about other options loses some activation in their respective neural
networks, due to decreases in neuronal firing patterns and inhibitory signals being sent by
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neurons representing the option currently attended. We implement our Leaky Accumulator
Model (LAM) to include only one free parameter ω which takes a value between zero and one
as follows:
If fixation is to option i:

Vi(j) = Vi(j-1) + si*ej

Equation 5a

For all unattended options k≠i:

Vk(j) = ωej*Vk(j-1)

Equation 5b

Equation 5a posits that the value (Vi) of option i at fixation j is equal to the previous
accumulated value of option i plus new information about option i, again defined as
subjective-value (si) multiplied by gaze-duration (ej), but only when option i is the current
focus of attention. For all other options k≠i that are not the focus of attention, Equation 5b is
used where ω decreases the value of option k as a function of how long it is not attended to in
seconds. Thus, values of ω closer to zero indicate stronger information leaks whereas values
of ω closer to one indicate slower leaks; if ω is set to one then the LAM is equivalent to the
SAM as well as the PRM if δ was set to one.
Discounting Models
The next class of DDM we consider is one which specifies a process where all options
have evidence about them constantly accumulated, but options that are currently the focus of
attention have evidence accumulated at an increased rate (Krajbich et al., 2011; Krajbich &
Rangel, 2010). The discounted accumulator models build on findings that attention appears to
bias accumulation processes leading to preferences for options which receive more attention
(Armel, Beaumel, Rangel, 2008; Shimojo et al., 2004), a process linked to modulated
activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009). Our
Discounted Accumulator Model (DAM) captures this bias with one free parameter Ɵ which
can take any value between zero and one:
If fixation is to option i:

Vi(j) = Vi(j-1) + si*ej

Equation 6a

For all unattended option k≠i:

Vk(j) = Vk(j-1) + Ɵ*sk*ej

Equation 6b
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The value (Vi) of option i in the DAM is identical to the LAM when that option is the
focus of attention (Equation 6a). The DAM and LAM differ when an option is not attended to.
Specifically, when an option is not being attended to, evidence (sk*ej) is still accumulated but
at a discounted rate with the discount factor being equal to Ɵ (Equation 6b). Therefore, a Ɵ of
zero indicates no accumulation of evidence for non-attended to options (a strong bias of
attention), while a Ɵ of one indicates a constant accumulation of evidence for all options
irrespective of where attention is directed (no attentional bias). As with the previous models,
if Ɵ is set to zero the DAM is equivalent to the SAM, as well as the PRM and LAM if their
parameters (ω and δ) were set equal to one.
Leaky Primacy-Recency Model
The last class of model we consider is a novel one which combines the processing
assumptions underlying the PRM and LAM forming a hybrid Leaky Primacy-Recency Model
(LPRM). The LPRM can be thought of as a generic neural network model. Like the leaky
accumulator leakage in the LPRM represents the decrease in activation across a given neural
network when an option is no longer being reinforced (attended to). The primacy-recency
parameter can be thought of as reflecting greater (faster) activation for network nodes that are
already active from previous fixations if primacy is found, while a recency effect might be
interpreted similarly to the discounting models with there being a boost in information
processing for currently fixated options. We define the LPRM with two free parameters:
If fixation is to option i:

Vi(j) = δVi(j-1) + si*ej

Equation 7a

For all unattended options k≠i:

Vk(j) = ωej*Vk(j-1)

Equation 7b

Each option i starts with a value of zero when no fixations have been made (Vi(0) = 0).
The Vi at each subsequent fixation j is calculated by the subjective-value (si) of the fixated
option multiplied by the gaze-duration (ej; at fixation j to option i) and the previous Vi
multiplied by δ (Equation 7a), with δ (bound between 0 and 10) indicating either a primacy (δ
> 1) or recency (δ < 1) effect. When options do not receive attention, Equation 7b is used with
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ω (bound between zero and one) indicating that the value of option k decreases as a function
of how long it is not attended to.
Levels of Comparison
We compare each of the models laid out in the previous section in three ways: First,
each model can be thought of as being deterministic, predicting that the option with the
highest value (V in Equations 1 – 7) will be selected, thus we compare the models in terms of
the percentage of choices they correctly predict. Second, each model can be thought of as
providing a probability that an option will be selected; the value (Vi) of a given option relative
to all other available options (see Equation 8 below). Thus, we can compare how strong a
model predicts a given option will be selected both when that prediction is correct and when it
is incorrect. Finally, to investigate a process measure beyond preference we analyze the
model’s ability to predict observed decision times (reaction times). The analysis of decision
time has long been proposed to provide additional insight into the cognitive processes
involved in decisions (Cartwright & Festinger, 1943; Luce, 1986) and the ability for process
models to predict decision times has been suggested as one way to further differentiate a
given model’s ability to reflect or capture underlying processes (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).
By analyzing choices and response times, we aim to determine which of the basic
mechanisms considered accounts best for behavioral data, which should provide important
hints concerning the cognitive mechanisms involved. Still, it should be noted that the fullfledged models discussed in the literature contain further auxiliary parameters and
assumptions which are not tested here. Hence, conclusions concerning the validity of specific
models cannot be derived from our research.
Study 1
In Study 1 we investigated which model better predicted individuals’ decisions to help
others. Specifically, we obtained subjective valuations of need (si) for various children then
measured fixations while participants choose which child to donate to, allowing us to directly
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compare the models introduced above in a novel domain (i.e., charitable giving, but see Study
2 for choices involving more common hedonic consumption decisions). We use need ratings
as our si as perceived need has been shown to be linked to decision to donate (Loewenstein &
Small, 2007). Awareness of need is the first step proposed to underlie charitable behavior
(Bekkers & Wiepking, 2010), and together with empathic feelings and perceived impact of a
donation one of the primary psychological drivers underlying donation decisions (Dickert,
Sagara, & Slovic, 2011).
Methods
Participants and Design. Ninety-two participants (58% Female; Mage = 21) with
normal to corrected-normal vision participated in Study 1. Two additional participants could
not be calibrated to the eye-tracker and were not tested. Study 1 preceded two unrelated
studies and the total time for all studies was one hour. Individuals received 12 Euro for their
participation.
Materials and Procedure. The options in the study consisted of 54 images of children
(~ 3° x 3° of visual angle) obtained from several charitable organizations. Participants were
first presented with each of the images, one at a time in random order, and provided ratings of
need for each image (child). Need ratings were indicated by increasing the diameter of a circle
(0 to 300 pixels) with a larger circle indicating more need2; these ratings served as the si used
in the models. Participants then engaged in an unrelated experiment lasting approximately 20
minutes before being calibrated to the eye tracker; eye movements were recorded using the
Eyegaze binocular system (LC Technologies) with a remote binocular sampling rate of 120Hz
and an accuracy of 0.45° of visual angle.
Participants were informed that they would be presented with varying numbers of
children in need and that for each set of children they should select the one child they would

2

si were scaled to be between 1 and 100 in Study 1 and Study 2 for convenience. Scaling had
no impact on the results reported.
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most like to donate to if given the chance (donations were hypothetical; see Study 2 for fully
incentivized decisions). The number of options available within a choice was manipulated as
a within-subjects factor (random order) and included set sizes of 2, 3, and 4 and the same
child was never shown more than once. Each set of choices was unique and which children
were shown in a given choice set was randomly determined for each participant. In total,
participants made 18 selections (six trials in each set size) by using the mouse to move a
yellow circle (displayed at the center of the screen at the start of each trial) so that it
encompassed their selection and clicking the left mouse button (see Figure 1). After choosing
a child, participants were asked to provide sympathy, need, and donation impact ratings for
the child they selected using the same response method employed in the pre-test. These
responses were included for exploratory reasons and we do not report analyses of these
variables as we had no a priori hypothesis relating them to the processing assumptions tested
here3.
-Insert Figure 1 HereEye Tracking Analyses and Model Fitting Procedure. Regions of interest (ROIs)
were defined as ~ 4° x 4° visual angle squares centered on each option. Trials in which no
fixations to any options were detected assumed random choice (e.g., 50% likelihood for an
option being picked from two options, 33% from three, and 25% from four). Consecutive
fixations on the same ROI or blank space were collapsed into a single fixation.
Model parameters were fit on the level of participant using a box-constrained quasiNewton method (Byrd, Lu, Nocedal, & Zhu, 1995) as implemented in R (2014) with starting
values for free parameters determined from a loose grid-search within parameter boundaries.

3

The pre-test and post-choice need ratings were strongly related (r = .72, p < .001), as were
the ratings between pre-test need and post-choice sympathy (r = .46, p < .001) and impact
ratings (r = .41, p < .001). These convergent correlations provide support for our use of need
ratings as a subjective measure of the value (si) our participants saw in donating to a given
child.
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Formally, for each model we used the Luce choice rule (Luce, 1959) to estimate the evidence
speaking in favor of a selected option (Equation 8):
Luce choice rule:

P(Vi(f) ) =

Vi(f)
L

V
l =1

Equation 8

l(f)

Where the model’s prediction for the probability (P) of option i being picked is its
value Vi(f) at choice, that is after the final fixation f, divided by the sum of values (Vl(f)) of all
options L. In the maximum likelihood estimation the set of parameters is determined that
maximizes (the sum of the log-transformed) likelihoods of all observed choices (i.e., ln(
P(Vi(f) ) ).

Parameters were searched on the level of participant (per person) simultaneously

taking into account choices between two, three, and four options4.
Results
Correct Prediction Comparison. We first compared each fitted model’s ability to
make correct predictions in a deterministic implementation. We find that all models perform
well above the overall chance level of 36% (i.e. [1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4]/3; see Figure 2, upper row).
However, models containing an influence of attention in addition to value made more correct
predictions than the Basev model (all t(91)s > 4.83, all ps < .001)5 and Basea model (all t(91)s
> 3.60, all ps < .001). Comparing the LPRM (the model making the most correct predictions)
to the LAM (the model making the second most correct predictions) we find the LPRM makes
significantly more correct predictions on average (t(91) = 3.42, p < .001). Examining the best
fitting model on the level of the individual we find a similar pattern of results with the LPRM
making the most correct predictions for 20% of participant followed by PRM (9%), the LAM
(8%), Basea (8%), Basev (7%), and DAM (1%): Note these totals are rounded and thus sum to
greater than 100%. For nearly half of the participants (49%) no clear classification was

4
5

Conducting separate fittings for each choice set size returned highly similar results.
All of the following t-tests are one-sided paired t-tests.
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possible since they could be best described by at least two models (LPRM and LAM: 10%,
LPRM and PRM: 9%, PRM, SAM, and DAM: 4%, LPRM, PRM, LAM DAM, and SAM:
6%, all else < 4%).
-Insert Figure 2 HereControlling for the number of options (2, 3, or 4) presented to participants, the odds
for a correct prediction of the LPRM increases by a factor of 1.79 in comparison to Basev
(Table 1) and the Odds for a correct prediction when using LPRM versus the LAM increased
by a factor of 1.16 (i.e. 1.79/1.54). Thus, in terms of our first measure of comparison we find
the LPRM makes more correct predictions on the aggregate level and performs as well as
PRM on the individual level, though its advantage over other models is meager.
-Insert Table 1 HereLikelihood Comparison. To compare the fit of each model to the data in terms of loglikelihoods (the strength of prediction) while taking into account the number of free
parameters, we computed the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974) for model k
according to:
AICk = 2*paramk - 2*∑(ln( P(Vi(f) ) ))
The factor param equals the number of parameters of the model k (i.e., either 0, 1 or 2)
when comparing the fit of models within participants and the number of parameters times the
number of participants when comparing the overall fit. We then compared AICs using delta
AIC: Δk = AICk – AICmin. A model k having values less than 2 in comparison to the best
fitting model with the lowest AIC has substantial support, values between 4 and 7 indicate
considerable support, while values greater than 10 suggest essentially no support for model k
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002, p. 446). It is worth noting that the SAM is nested in the LAM
and the PRM which are both nested in the LPRM. Thus in case a less complex model fits
better, AIC differences can never be higher than the punishment term for the number of free
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parameters (i.e., 2 between SAM and LAM/PRM, 4 between SAM and LPRM, and 2 between
LAM/PRM and LPRM).
The bottom rows of Figure 2 display the delta LLs and AICs for each model.
Examining overall AICs we find the LPRM outperforms each of the other models (ΔAICs >
36), while when considering the best fitting model on the level of the individual the LPRM
only fits 16% of participants best; the SAM fits the majority best (30%), followed by the
LAM (21%), Basea (13%), PRM (12%), Basev (8%), and lastly the DAM (0%). Computing
ΔAIC for those individuals fit best by the LPRM to their next best fitting model we find very
weak support for the LPRMs superiority (M = 1.92, Median = 1.06); for those fit best by other
models the LPRM did on average about as good as they did (M = 5.17, Median = 2.36).
Therefore, in terms of AIC, we find that the LPRM fits the data on the aggregate level best,
while when categorizing on the level of the individual less complex sub-models of the LPRM
(i.e., LAM, PRM, SAM) can describe 63% of participants better and models assuming no
accumulation process can describe the remaining 21% of participants best.
-Insert Figure 2 HereDecision Time Comparison. To examine the extent to which reaction times reflected
si in general we first examined whether decision times were faster when the selected option
had a higher si relative to other options as one would expect that when the selected option
greatly dominated other options it would lead to faster decisions. Correlating skew corrected
decision times6 on Basev model’s predicted choice probabilities (PBase_v) per individual we
find there to be a negative relationship indicating that the more one option dominated another
in terms of si (i.e., at the start of the decision) the faster a decision was made (see the leftmost
black dot in Figure 3).

6

As would be expected decision times showed significant positive skew (Mardia Skew = 5.34,
χ(1)2 = 1448.04, p < .001). We corrected for this by employing the following log correction
equation which reduced skew to ~ .001: ln(Decision Time + .0872227).
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To see how well each of the accumulator models could predict reaction times we first
constructed absolute choice probabilities which corrected for the starting probability an option
would be picked (Pabs = abs|P - PBase_v|). We use Pabs rather than P because as indicated above
si influences decision times, thus by removing PBase_v we control for this effect allowing the
Pabs of each model to reflect changes in the value of the selected option over the course of the
decision rather than initial differences in si7. We expect that if a model is capturing the
accumulation process a larger Pabs should predict longer decision times as it reflects greater
changes in the value of the option relative to its si. The black dots in Figure 3 display the
median of individual correlations between the Pabs of each model and skew corrected decision
times. For the SAM and DAM these relationships are negative and weak. While a small
positive relationship was found between the PRMs Pabs and decision times, both the LAM and
LPRM showed larger positive relationships between their Pabs and decision times. Thus, in
terms of the models tested, only the PRM, LAM and LPRM show relationships in line with
the predictions of the general evidence accumulation framework. For an overall evaluation of
fit for these three models, we also regressed Pabs as predictor (with a random intercept for
participants) on normalized decision times. The regression model for LPRM shows the best fit
in terms of log-Likelihood (LPRM: -1526.69, LAM: -1533, PRM: -1539).
-Insert Figure 3 HereEstimated Parameters. Figure 4 displays the parameter estimates for each model.
For the PRM we find that the majority of participants (77%) showed a primacy effect (M =
2.47; Median = 1.62; CI95% [1.97, 2.95]). In addition, 39% of participants showed very strong
primacy with estimated δ being greater than two. These primacy effects could be the result of

7

Strict interpretation of the drift rate as an options subjective value would predict negative
relationships between P and decision time for all models. From such a perspective, models
with the strongest negative relation would provide the best fit to the response time data (i.e.,
the SAM in the current analysis). The last author of this manuscript supports such an
interpretation.
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initial fixations driving choice - choosing the first option seen. This is unlikely to be the case
however, as initial fixations to an option were no more predictive than chance when two (M =
.50; CI95% [.46, .55]), three (M = .37; CI95% [.33, .41]), or four (M = .22; CI95% [.19, .26])
options were available.
The DAM’s parameter Ɵ was found to be at the lower end of the parameter space (M
= .06; CI95% [.02, .10]) providing insight into why the DAM fit poorly compared to other
models, namely since there was limited evidence of discounting with a parameter close to
zero. The LAMs ω parameter was less than one for 85% of participants (equal to 1 for 15% of
participants) indicating a leak of information (about 30% per second) over time (M = .71;
Median = .76; CI95% [.66, .76]). The LPRM model combining a primacy/recency (δ: M = 3.37;
Median = 2.14; CI95% [2.72, 4.01]) and leakage (ω: M = .66; Median = .69; CI95% [.61, .72])
parameter revealed similar parameter estimates as the PRM and LAM: 79% of participants
showed a recency effect and 86% a leak of information over time. The correlation between
the δ and ω was negative and strong which might suggest some dependency between them,
suggesting caution in interpreting their estimated parameters (r(90) = -.47, p < .001).
-Insert Figure 4 HereDiscussion
In Study 1 we tested what improvements in fit could be obtained over a simple value
maximization model by employing models integrating attention and various processing
assumptions. In line with the general contentions of the DDM framework we find strong
support for both attention and subjective value being important predictors of choice, with the
SAM outperforming the other base models. In terms of the various processing assumptions
tested we do not find very strong support for any single model: Each model captured some
share of participants’ data better than the others. Nevertheless, the AIC and percentage of
correct predictions indicate that the LPRM provides the best overall fit, while both the LAM
and LPRM were able to correctly predict decision times. Thus, while the results are mixed,
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there is some evidence that leaky processes, perhaps combined with primacy-recency
processes, provide better fits to the data and increase predictive accuracy.
Study 2
While Study 1 provides support for the general role of attention in the preference
construction processes, and weaker support for a leaky-primacy process providing the best fit
(account) of this process, one might question the robustness of these findings and the ability
of each model to cross-predict fully incentivized choices between different types of decisions
(choices) and increased numbers of options. Therefore, in Study 2 we test the generalizability
of the models by: (1) Expanding the number of options to choose from, (2) including different
types of choices, and (3) making choices consequential (providing incentivization). In
addition, drawing on the rich literature of out-of-sample predictions (Erev et al., 2010;
Busemeyer & Wang, 2000) we also examine whether fixed parameter versions of each model
can capture these new decisions. The fixed parameters were the median parameter values
from Study 1: PRM (δ = 1.62), LAM (ω = .76), DAM (Ɵ = 0)8, and LPRM (δ = 2.14; ω =
.69).
Methods
Thirty-two new participants (59% female; Mage = 21) with normal or corrected to
normal vision participated in Study 2 which lasted approximately 45 minutes. Participants
first provided ratings of need for 70 children and appetitiveness ratings for 70 candy bars
using a horizontal slider (500 pixels wide). As in Study 1, these ratings served as the
subjective values (si) used in each model. Following a short filler task participants made
choices between sets of either two, four, or eight candy bars (consumption choices) or
children (donation choices as in Study 1): Five trials of each choice set size and type,
amounting to 30 choices in total were made and trails were presented in random order for

Note that DAM with Ɵ = 0 is identical to SAM; thus both models fit the data equally well
when parameters are fixed.
8
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each participant. Participants were informed that one of the children they chose would be
selected at random and have 2.00 Euro donated to them on their behalf and one of the candy
bars they chose would be randomly selected and given to them at the end of the experiment.
Choices were made by moving a mouse wheel up/down - highlighting the options one by one
with a white outline - and clicking the left mouse button once the option they wished to select
was highlighted: Post-choice questions were not included. All other aspects were identical to
Study 1.
Results
We fit each model using the same procedures described in Study 1. In addition, we
assessed the fits of each model using the estimated median values of the parameter values
from Study 1.
Correct Prediction Comparison. As in Study 1, we find that the LPRM makes the
most correct predictions for both consumption and donation decisions (Figure 2, second and
third column upper row). We find that all models perform well above overall chance level
29% (i.e., [1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8]/3) (see Figure 2, upper row). Comparing the LPRM to the next
best fitting model, the LAM, the LPRM makes significantly more correct predictions for
donation, t(31) = 1.95, p < .05, and consumption decisions, t(31) = 2.79, p < .005. In terms of
each model’s ability to predict on the level of the individual we find the LPRM makes the
most correct predictions for the largest share of participants for donation decisions (25%)
followed by LAM (9%), PRM (3%), and Basev (3%). The majority of participants donation
decisions (59%) could be best described by at least two models (LPRM and LAM: 13%,
LPRM and Basea: 6%, LPRM, LAM, and PRM: 6%, all else < 4%). For consumption choices,
the LPRM also predicts most participants’ choices best (19%) followed by Basea (6%), and
PRM (3%). However, the majority of participants consumption choices (72%) could be best
described by at least two models (LPRM and LAM: 16%, LPRM and PRM: 9%, LPRM,
LAM, and PRM: 9%, SAM, PRM, and DAM: 6%, all else < 4%). We find that the LPRM
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provides the most correct predictions (83%) when using the median values of the parameters
estimated in Study 1 for consumption choices and performs similarly to the best model LAM
(76% for LPRM versus 77% for LAM) for donation choices. The percentage of correctly
predicted choices is almost identical between models with fitted versus fixed parameters
providing some evidence that the current results are not simply the result of over-fitting. Thus,
in line with the results of Study 1, we find the LPRM makes more correct predictions on the
aggregate, using both estimated and out-of-sample parameter values, though on the level of
the individual its support is relatively small over simpler models.
Likelihood Comparison. The bottom row, second and third column, of Figure 2
displays the Delta AICs (i.e. the lowest AIC subtracted from values) for each model
separately for consumption and donation decisions. As in Study 1 the LPRM outperforms
each of the other models for consumption (ΔAICs > 2.80) and donation decisions (ΔAICs >
25.41). While the LAM fits the most participants best for consumption decisions (44%), the
LPRM fit the most participants best for donation decisions (44%). Nevertheless, the
improvements in fit for those fit better by the LAM in consumption decisions (M = 1.15;
Median = 1.19) and those fit better by the LPRM in donation decisions (M = 1.94; Median =
1.02) over the next best fitting model was barely worth mention. For participants fit best by
other models little decrease in fit was found comparing the best fitting model to the LAM in
consumption (M = 2.30; Median = 1.73) and LPRM in donation (M = 2.15; Median = 1.70)
decisions.
Examining the fits of each model using the median values of parameters estimated in
Study 1 we also find that the LPRM provides the best fit for both consumption and donation
decisions in terms of log-Likelihoods (shaded bars, Figure 2, second row). Thus, the LPRM
provides the best overall fit in Study 2 whether parameters were fitted individually to choices
or used median values of parameters from Study 1. Importantly, this again suggests that the
good fit of the LPRM does not result from over-fitting.
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Decision Time Comparison. As in Study 1 we examined whether decision times were
faster when the selected option had a higher si by correlating skew-corrected decision times9
per person on PBase_v (black triangles and diamonds in Figure 3). As in Study 1, a negative
relationship emerged such that decisions were made faster when the selected option had
higher si.
For the SAM and DAM, the median of the individual correlations was only
significantly different from 0 for consumption decisions. The PRM, LAM, and LPRM all
showed positive relationships between their Pabs and decision times. For an overall evaluation
of fit we also regressed Pabs as predictor (with a random intercept by participant) on
normalized decision times as in Study 1 for donation and consumption choices separately.
Similar to Study 1, the LPRM had the highest log-Likelihood value in comparison to all other
evidence accumulation models (all differences above 14 for consumption choices and above 4
for donation choices). Importantly, these results replicate when using the median values of
parameters estimated in Study 1 (Figure 3, grey symbols).
Estimated Parameters. The parameter estimates for both consumption and donation
decisions are shown in Figure 5. For the PRM (δ) we find that the majority of participants
show a primacy effect in both consumption (88%; M = 4.44; Median = 3.06; CI95% [3.28,
5.60]) and donation decisions (91%; M = 3.51; Median = 2.17; CI95% [2.43, 4.58]), though the
relationship between parameter values across choice types was non-significant, r(30) = -.09, p
= .63. As in Study 1, many participants (75% in consumption and 50% in donation decisions)
showed very strong primacy with δ being estimated as > 2. Also as in Study 1, initial fixations
were no more predictive than chance for consumption (49%, 24%, and 10%) and donation
decisions (44%, 18%, and 12%) in each set size suggesting they were not driving the strong
primacy estimates. The estimates of the DAMs Ɵ were found to be at the lower end of the

Decision times showed significant skew (Mardia Skew = 56.78, χ(1)2 = 9141.85, p < .001)
which we corrected for as in Study 1: ln(Decision Time - 1.018482).
9
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parameter space for consumption (0 for all participants) and donation decisions (M = .003;
Median = 0; CI95% [-.001, .007]) as in Study 1. The LAMs ω parameter was less than one for
the vast majority of participants for consumption (94%; M = .43; Median = .44; CI95% [.33,
.54]) and donation decisions (100% M = .41; Median = .39; CI95% [.30, .51]) indicating a leak
of information over time as in Study 1; the relationship in parameters across domains was
non-significant, r(30) = .19, p = .30. For the LPRMs δ all participants showed a primacy
effect for both consumption (100%; M = 5.59; Median = 4.60; CI95% [4.44, 6.73]) and most
for donation decisions (91%; M = 5.56; Median = 5.05; CI95% [4.23, 6.87]) though the
relationship across domains was non-significant, r(30) = .18, p = .34. For the ω parameter the
majority of participants in both consumption (94%; M = .46; Median = .49; CI95% [.35, .56])
and donation (100%; M = .45; Median = .46; CI95% [.35, .55]) decisions had parameter values
below one indicating an information leak over time; the relationship across domains was nonsignificant, r(30) = .17, p = .36. The correlations between δ and ω were negative and
significant for consumption decisions (r(30) = -.65, p < .001), but non-significant for donation
decisions (r(30) = -.28, p = .12. Thus, in terms of parameter values we find estimated
parameters are similar across domains, fall in line with the average estimates of Study 1, but
are not highly stable within an individual across domains for any model.
-Insert Figure 5 HereDiscussion
In Study 2 we replicate the finding that models which include an impact of attentional
allocation provide a better fit than those relying on subjective values alone, for consumption
and donation decisions, providing support for the proposition that attentional allocation plays
a role in the preference construction process. In terms of our process comparisons for fitted
models we find that overall the LAM and LPRM provide the best fits to the data, for both
consumption and donation decisions, though their improvement in fit was not very large on
the level of the participant. For the fixed parameter values estimated from Study 1 we find the
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LPRM provides the best fit, even outperforming the PRM and DAM using parameters
estimated from the data, though again the increase in fit was rather small. Furthermore, while
we find average parameter values to be similar for both kinds of decisions in each model the
within-participant stability was not strong across choice types. In terms of the ability to
predict decisions times we again find that the LAM and LPRM provide the most predictive
power. Thus, while a leaky accumulation process provides the best fit overall only minimal
support is provided as to its superiority over simple accumulation processes.
General Discussion
In two studies we find evidence for the role of directed attention in the preference
construction process, with models incorporating attentional allocation providing large
increases in predictive accuracy for choices and a superior fit to decision times. These
findings bolster assertions that DDMs can increase predictive accuracy for choices over
classic value maximization models, and that evidence accumulation processes can at least in
part be captured (reflected) by directed visual attention (i.e. fixation durations; Just &
Carpenter, 1984).
In each study we find that a process which assumes a leak of accumulated evidence for
options that are not currently the focus of attention, and an increased weight for earlier
accumulated evidence, fits both pro-social and hedonic consumption decisions and decision
times better on average, even when using parameters estimated from a different data set (i.e.,
out of sample prediction; Erev et al., 2010) and incentivizing decisions. Nevertheless, in terms
of our results speaking directly to the superiority of leaky plus primacy processes (i.e., the
LPRM model) it must be noted that the improvement in fit they provided was not very large
and its greater fit on the aggregate was primarily driven by the result that the LPRM fit
between 16% (Study 1) to 44% (Study 2 donation) participants better than any other model.
Furthermore, the majority of participants in both studies was described best by a less complex
evidence accumulation model that either did not include the primacy/recency process (LAM),
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the leaky process (PRM), or both (SAM). As such we do not wish to suggest that the LPRM
model is “better” than all other models, or that any of the models we examined here are
superior for that matter. Instead, each model appears to capture some participants’ behavior
better than others and less complex accumulation models (i.e., LAM, PRM, SAM) can
generally describe a majority of participants best, indicating that there is some variation in the
types of cognitive processes underlying individuals’ decisions. Thus, the current results
suggest that future explorations comparing DDMs, or any other computational models for that
matter, are best examined on the level of the individual rather than on the aggregate.
In addition, it is important to note that we reduced previously developed models to
their central processing assumptions. Thus, these models were not tested in their more
complex implementations. This was done as we were most interested in providing a clear
comparison of their fundamental processing mechanisms rather than specific model
implementations (e.g., inclusion of temperature or noise parameters, or decision thresholds).
However, it is possible that with more complex implementations other processes might
perform as well, or even outperform, the processes underlying the LAM and LPRM.
Therefore, future comparisons of these processes, which further refine the models housing
them, are necessary before strong conclusions are drawn about the processes that underlie
these types of decisions. It is also important to examine how well these models and their
underlying processes perform when options are defined by multiple attributes (see for review,
Gwo-Hshiung, 2010). Such investigations would allow for greater insight into the abilities of
each model to capture the information accumulation and storage of both positive and negative
attribute information in addition to capturing the impact of attributes with differing degrees of
importance.
The studies presented here provide a test of the process assumptions underlying
popular accumulation models (Krajbich, et al., 2011; Raab & Johnson, 2007; Usher &
McClelland, 2001) and find that on average a process in which accumulated information
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diminishes over time, and weights earlier accumulated information heavier provides a fairly
good account for choices and decision times. This finding is relevant not only for those
interested in process models, but more generally to anyone interested in the accumulation,
storage, and use of information during choice. For instance, the leaky process combined with
greater weighting for earlier accumulated evidence is roughly in line with the findings of
decreasing excitation and inhibitory/excitatory activations in neural networks (McClelland et
al., 2010; Thagard, 1989; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Thus, the current findings not only
provide support for the general DDM framework and the ability of directed attention to
capture the preference construction process, they motivate continued comparisons of such
processes, particularly on the level of the individual, and the neurological aspects that underlie
them.
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Table 1. Logistic regression with random intercept per participant (Bates et al. 2014) with
correct prediction (1 = yes, 0 = no) regressed on models and number of options presented.
b

se(b)

z

Factor Odds (i.e., eb)

0.62

0.08

7.95***

1.86

Basea

0.03

0.07

0.48

1.03

SAM

0.28

0.07

3.75***

1.32

PRM

0.39

0.08

5.19***

1.48

LAM

0.43

0.08

5.72***

1.54

DAM

0.29

0.07

3.90***

1.34

LPRM

0.58

0.07

7.58***

1.79

Three options

-0.21

0.050

-4.26***

0.81

Four options

-0.28

0.049

-5.72***

0.76

Intercept
Model (control = Basev)

Set size (control = Two options)

Note. Regression weights bs are log(Odds) for a correct prediction. BaseV and two options are
set as controls for dummy coding. *** p < .001.
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Figure 1. Screenshot of a selection trial with four options in Study 1; white outlines indicate
ROIs which were not visible to participants; photographs were presented in color.
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Figure 2. Bar charts displaying Percentage of Correctly Predicted Choices (first row; black
horizontal lines indicating overall chance-performance across choice set sizes), Delta Minus
Log-Likelihoods (second row), and Delta Akaike Information Criterion (third row) for
Base_v, Base_a, the Standard Accumulator Model (SAM), Primacy Recency Model (PRM),
Leaky Accumulator Model (LAM), Discounted Accumulator Model (DAM), and the Leaky
Primacy-Recency Model (LPRM), for fits to decisions in Study 1 (left column), Study 2
Consumption (middle column), and Study 2 Donation (right column). Grey bars indicate
evaluations of models with fitted parameters and overlapping shaded bars indicate evaluations
of models when free parameters in Study 2 are fixed using best-fitting median parameters
from Study 1. Note that Delta Minus Log-Likelihoods for models with no parameters also
change when parameters are fixed since values result from subtraction with LPRM.
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Figure 3. Estimator of the median and a nonparametric 95%-confidence intervals of
individual correlations between normalized decision times and predicted decision times for
models in both studies with fitted (black symbols) and fixed (grey symbols) parameters
estimated from Study 1.
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Figure 4. Histograms of best fitting parameters for each model in Study 1. Proportion (y-axis)
of participants fit best by a given parameter value (x-axis) for the Primacy Recency Model
(PRM), the Leaky Accumulator Model (LAM), the Discounted Accumulator Model (DAM),
and the primacy recency parameter (LPRM - Primacy/Recency) and leakage parameter
(LPRM – Leak) for the Leaky Primacy Recency Model.
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Figure 5. Histograms of best fitting parameters for each model in Study 2 over donation
(shaded bars) and consumption (grey bars) decisions. Proportion (y-axis) of participants fit
best by a given parameter value (x-axis) for the Primacy Recency Model (PRM), the Leaky
Accumulator Model (LAM), the Discounted Accumulator Model (DAM), and the primacy
recency parameter (LPRM - Primacy/Recency) and leakage parameter (LPRM – Leak) for
the Leaky Primacy Recency Model.
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